What’s Happening in Missouri

1. Remember what a referendum is: It’s citizens reserving the power to themselves to approve or veto a bill passed by the legislature. 

  • For most pieces of legislation, the General Assembly passes it, and then the Governor chooses to sign or veto it. This is a power given to elected governors by the people of Missouri, through the constitutional framework the people have adopted. 
  • At the same time, the people of Missouri have reserved the right to  enact or reject acts of the general assembly if they submit  enough signatures in a defined set of time to force an up or down vote. 
  • This defined time period (90 days) is the same amount of time for a bill to go into effect as a law. This is really important. The people have reserved to themselves the full amount of time before a bill becomes a law to decide whether to stop the enactment and instead set up a vote at the next general election. 
  • Anyone can read the constitutional rules for themself in Article Three of the state constitution. Sections 49, 52(a) and 52(b) are particularly important:
    • III Section 49.  “Reservation of power to enact and reject laws. — The people reserve power to propose and enact or reject laws and amendments to the constitution by the initiative, independent of the general assembly, and also reserve power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly, except as hereinafter provided.”
    • III Section 52(b).  “Veto power — elections — effective date. — The veto power of the governor shall not extend to measures referred to the people.  All elections on measures referred to the people shall be had at the general state elections, except when the general assembly shall order a special election.  Any measure referred to the people shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.  This section shall not be construed to deprive any member of the general assembly of the right to introduce any measure.”

Sometimes it’s helpful to simplify the long legalistic sentences to really internalize what powers we have kept for ourselves as Missourians, over our politicians. 

  • III Section 49. “The people…reserve power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly, except as hereinafter provided.”
  • III Section 52(a). “A referendum may be ordered…either by petitions signed by five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state…Referendum petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state [within] ninety days…”
  • III Section 52(b). “Any measure referred to the people shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.”

So this is exactly what happened with HB1, the new congressional district gerrymander, that was passed in September: 

  • A great big group of Missourians said they wanted to exercise their referendum rights to force a statewide vote on HB1. 
  • Enough Missourians signed referendum petitions to force the vote (way more than the constitution requires, in fact), and those signatures were submitted to the Secretary of State in advance of the 90 day deadline. 
  • Because those conditions were met, HB1 now “shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.” 
  • We will know whether or not HB1 becomes the law in Missouri when voters approve it or reject it next year — and not otherwise. 

2. The particulars of the referendum process have been ironed out over decades. That bills are suspended when citizens submit signatures is settled law, going back more than 100 years.

 Anyone can read for themselves cases from the Missouri Supreme Court, Western District Court of Appeals, and Cole County Circuit Court. Here are a few cases that have been cited in court filings and the press:

  • “[The p]urpose of referendum is to suspend or annul a law which has not gone into effect and to provide the people a means of giving expression to a legislative proposition, and require their approval before it becomes operative as law; and its purpose does not intend to invalidate a law already operative.” 

Going further, the Court explained that Section 52(b): 

  • “is a clear declaration that the referendum provided for in 52(a) is not intended to apply to laws that have become effective.” 
  • In State ex rel. Barrett v. Dallmeyer (1922), the Missouri Supreme Court articulated that the legislation in question “was suspended by the filing of referendum petitions.” From that case: 
    • “If, therefore, it be true that the Legislature may postpone the effective date of a law by an analogy of reasoning it must also follow that the operation of a statute may be deferred by the invocation of the referendum, for the exercise of legislative power by the people through the referendum is simply a reservation to themselves of a share of the legislature power.”

The act…was suspended by the filing of referendum petitions…

  • In State ex rel. Kemper v. Carter (1914), the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the question directly of whether the submission of a “proper, timely, and sufficient referendum petition” suspends the act. It concluded it does. From that case:
    • “It is fairly clear that, if the provisions of our referendum section of the Constitution are self-enforcing, then the mere lodging of a timely, legal, and sufficient referendum petition with the Secretary of State is all that the petitioners were required to do, and that the law affected, or sought so to be, is halted, regardless of any affirmative act on the part of the Secretary of State or the Attorney General.”
  • Western District precedent. Whether or not a bill subject to referendum was enacted law — or a piece of legislation that had been suspended with the submission of signatures — came up in a dispute about the ballot language for the 2017-2018 referendum on a so-called ‘right to work’ law. That the law had been suspended was not up for debate (again, it’s settled law), but the verb choice regarding the pending legislation really did matter. From the Stickler v. Ashcroft ruling in the Western District Court of Appeals: 
    • “Use of the phrase “passed by” [in the ballot title statement for Proposition A] may actually be more accurate than using the word “enacted.” The dictionary defines “enact” as “to establish by legal and authoritative act: make into a law; esp: to perform the last act of legislation upon (a bill) that gives the validity of law.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary of the English Language 745 (unabridged ed. 1993). Thus, use of the verb “enact” may suggest that SB 19 actually became effective as law. But — assuming the referendum petition receives sufficient signatures — SB 19 will be suspended or annulled, and will not take effect as law unless and until it is approved by a majority of Voters.
  • Cole County precedent. On a referendum eventually voted on in 1982, supporters of a law that was challenged by a referendum wanted the law to take effect while signatures were being counted — but that whole idea was rejected in Cole County Circuit Court. From Kaw Transport Company et al. v Whitmer et al: 
    • “Plaintiffs argue that provisions of Section 116.200 require a certification process by the Secretary of State of Missouri before the staying effect of a referendum petition takes effect… This Court does not agree with plaintiffs’ position…”
    • “Since the adoption in 1908 of the initiative and referendum amendment to the Constitution of the State of Missouri it has been consistently held that the initiative and referendum process and legislative powers are reserved and retained by the people from the normal legislative power vested in this General Assembly…”
    • “The right of the people of this State… by use of the referendum process to stay the operation of legislation upon the happening of certain events, and to submit that legislation to a vote of all the people is superior to any right possessed by the plaintiffs.”

3. The last time Missourians called a referendum, Secretary of State Jay Ashcroft (R) proactively explained to citizens why and how legislation would be suspended with the submission of signatures. 

This was not a big deal at the time, and the so-called ‘right to work’ law was paused when citizens submitted signatures. 

Compare the unlawful and outrageous actions of Secretary of State Denny Hoskins this year to the actions of Secretary of State Jay Ashcroft in 2017: 

  • “Missouri’s right to work law passed by state lawmakers and signed by Governor Greitens in February has effectively been suspended... The labor organizations met a deadline to present required petition signatures to the secretary of state’s office for the law to be placed on the ballot.  It won’t be known if there’s a sufficient number of valid signatures until the secretary of state completes tabulations of the petitions and announces results in early February.
  • The [Jay Ashcroft] secretary of state’s office provided Missourinet with an electronic image of a 1982 newspaper story which reported that then Secretary of State James Kirkpatrick had determined the truck law was suspended after petition signatures were filed.”

Josh Hawley (R) was Missouri Attorney General at the time, and together with Ashcroft, saw to it that the referendum process was conducted lawfully. 

4. Regarding the 1982 referendum, staff for then-Attorney General John Ashcroft argued clearly and forcefully that legislation was suspended and not enacted once signatures were submitted. 

You can read all about it in the archives posted on current SOS Denny Hoskins’ website (!), in a 1981 Columbia Missourian story: 

  • “Allowing a controversial big trucks law to go into effect even temporarily would go against the people’s constitutional right to refer laws passed by the Legislature, an assistant attorney general said Monday. Assistant Attorney General Preston Dean [for John Ashcroft] made the comments on a suit brought in Cole County Circuit Court by a group of trucking companies.”
  • “In their suit, the trucking firms said the big trucks law should be in effect until Secretary of State James Kirkpatrick determines that the group opposed to the law had collected enough valid signatures to force the issue to a statewide vote.”
  • “Kirkpatrick accepted the petitions and in line with an attorney general’s opinion last week, the big trucks law was automatically suspended. At Monday’s hearing, Dean said it would take Kirkpatrick about six weeks to check the petitions. If the law were allowed to go into effect until then, it would defeat the purpose intended by the petition campaign, Dean told Kinder. Such a ruling would ‘erode the constitutional power’ of the people to refer laws enacted by the Legislature, Dean said.”
  • “And Dean said once a law was allowed to go into effect, even temporarily, it could create major administrative problems for the state. The law, enacted by the General Assembly earlier this year, was to become effective at midnight Sunday. Secretary of State Kirkpatrick ordered the law suspended Sunday afternoon when petitions forcing a referendum election on the issue were filed with his office.”

5. Catherine Hanaway and Denny Hoskins surely know all of this — but are misstating the outcome of a recent federal court case (that they lost) to block citizens from submitting referendum signatures to suspend the HB1 gerrymander. 

Jason Hancock at the Missouri Independent explained it well in his December 14 newsletter: 

“No one has ever accused Jay Ashcroft of being a lefty. The former Republican secretary of state was a regular source of ire for Democrats during his eight years in office, whether it was how he crafted ballot summaries or his advocacy for things like book bans and voter ID. But in 2017, when a coalition of labor unions delivered 300,000 signatures to put a right-to-work law on the statewide ballot, Ashcroft followed long-established precedent and suspended the law until voters could weigh in the next year.

It’s what happened in 1981, when James Kirkpatrick — Missouri’s longest-serving secretary of state and the namesake of the building that houses the office — put a new trucking law on hold after signatures were submitted for a referendum. A lawsuit demanding immediate implementation was dismissed.

Or go back to 1952, when the Missouri Supreme Court explicitly said the purpose of a referendum is to suspend or annul a law before it has gone into effect. Allowing a law to take effect and then later be suspended, the court warned, would invite instability and confusion.

For decades, the process has been clear: when citizens gather enough signatures for a referendum, the challenged law doesn’t take effect until voters get a say. That’s why last week’s decision from Secretary of State Denny Hoskins came as a shock. On the advice of Attorney General Catherine Hanaway, he announced a gerrymandered congressional map would go into effect despite the submission of 305,000 signatures for a referendum. Hanaway even bragged online: “The Missouri FIRST map is now the law.”

A lawsuit is all but certain, and the referendum itself keeps chugging along, with the secretary of state proceeding with signature verification. But the move is the latest example of a “throw everything against the wall and see what sticks” strategy to keep the map away from voters.

Does the attorney general really believe she can upend the referendum?

It’s a question I posed to nearly two dozen GOP consultants, lawmakers and lobbyists over the last week, with the overwhelming consensus quickly landing on two motivations. The first is that the political incentives for Republicans demand a public fight for the Trump-endorsed map, regardless of whether they truly believe they can win. For Hanaway, especially — an appointed attorney general hailing from the pre-Trump era of GOP politics — loudly demonstrating loyalty is her best bet to avoid a 2028 primary challenge.

The second is strategic delay. By dragging out the fight as the election calendar tightens, they hope courts will become increasingly reluctant to intervene. Even if that gamble fails, forcing the referendum campaign to spend resources on litigation serves its own purpose.

Whatever the motivation, the effect is the same: subverting Missourians’ constitutional right to check legislative power. Missouri’s referendum system exists to ensure lawmakers can’t insulate themselves from accountability. When 300,000 people sign their names to challenge a law, they aren’t offering a suggestion. They are exercising a constitutional veto belonging to the voters alone.

Republicans argue the referendum and initiative process has become increasingly influenced by out-of-state special interests. There is some truth to this claim, particularly when it comes to campaign funding. But that doesn’t justify weakening or dismantling a constitutional right that has served voters for generations.

Letting the map remain in effect while signatures await verification is not a conservative reading of the constitution. It is not tradition. And it’s certainly not respect for the rule of law.

It’s a power play — and a particularly revealing one.

As it turns out, it’s easier to fight for one’s principles than to live by them.”

  • The People Not Politicians campaign responded to Hanaway and her office regarding the attempts to confuse the public, and you can read the full takedown with other documents in the state’s federal lawsuit against Missouri citizens here. Money quotes: 

“Our position has always been—and remains—that People Not Politicians’ (“PNP”) submission of signatures on December 9 prevents H.B. 1 from going into effect on December 11 unless the Secretary of State issues a formal determination that the petition is insufficient. Indeed, we specifically stated at the hearing on November 25 that “it is turning in the signatures [that] ensures that the law will not otherwise go into effect on the 90th day.” ECF No. 38, at 45 (“Tr.”). That is likewise the position that your witness, the Director of Elections, took in a sworn declaration to the Court in this case, stating under oath that “if the defendants succeed in collecting the necessary signatures, the Missouri Constitution will prevent the new map from taking effect until a referendum occurs.” ECF No. 3-1 ¶ 20 (“Director of Elections Decl.”)… 

Indeed, thevery reason the State sought to enjoin PNP from turning in signatures, and the reason it requested a ruling from the Court before December 11, was that the submission of the petition itself had some immediate legal effect. It is puzzling that you have now changed your view on this question, particularly given your accusation that it is PNP and its counsel that are backsliding on representations to the Court.”

We take our duty of candor to the Court extremely seriously and we hope that you do too. Therefore, we respectfully suggest that you may want to evaluate your own duties in light of your repeated representations to the Court about the harm that Plaintiffs would face from PNP’s submission of signatures by December 11, 2025.